



*"The project has received funding from the European Union's Internal Security Fund – Police under the grant agreement No 815347"*

## Deliverable D2.1

### Executive Summary

# Report on coherent approach for terrorist risk assessment and management

**March 2019**

## Project Details

Project acronym	SHERPA
Project full title	Shared and coHerent European Railway Protection Approach
Grant Agreement no.	815347
Call ID and Topic	ISFP-2017-AG-PROTECT, Topic ISFP-2017-AG-PROTECT Protection
Project Timeframe	01/11/2018 – 31/10/2020
Duration	24 Months
Coordinator	UIC – Marie-Hélène Bonneau (bonneau@uic.org)

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## Document details

Title	Executive Summary of the report on coherent approach for terrorist risk assessment and management
Work Package	WP2
Date of the document	29/03/2019
Responsible Partner	SNCB
Reviewing Partner	All partners
Dissemination level	Public

## Consortium – List of partners

Partner No	Short name	Name	Country
1	UIC	<a href="#">UNION INTERNATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER</a>	France
2	DB	<a href="#">DEUTSCHE BAHN AG</a>	Germany
3	FS SPA	<a href="#">FERROVIE DELLO STATO ITALIANE SPA</a>	Italy
4	PKP S.A.	<a href="#">POLSKIE KOLEJE PANSTWOWE SPOLKA AKCYJNA</a>	Poland
5	SNCB	<a href="#">SOCIETE NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER BELGES</a>	Belgium
6	SNCF	<a href="#">SNCF</a>	France



## INTRODUCTION

### 1. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Terrorist attacks carried out in the latest years show an alarming increase of indiscriminate violent actions carried out against civilians gathering in public spaces. Even though railway transport represents a critical infrastructure for any European Country, stations and trains can be essentially regarded as soft targets due to their nature of inherently open systems. Several initiatives aiming at increasing their protection from terrorist attacks were undertaken in the past years at various levels, nevertheless the knowledge about the phenomenon itself and possible counter-measures is still quite fragmented and presents many gaps.

The SHERPA project aims at improving the overall protection level for stations and trains in Europe against terrorist attacks by implementing multiple synergistic actions towards the relevant stakeholders, such as: providing and sharing an up-to-date, high-value knowledge base on threats and countermeasures (both technical and procedural); defining a coherent approach for risk assessment, risk management, crisis and disaster recovery management; strengthening co-operation among stakeholders through high-level international trainings and other practical tools; outlining needs and requirements for industry and research to focus on to better help railways in coping with both present and future threats.

Five among the most relevant key-players in the European railway sector (DB, FS, PKP, SNCB, SNCF) take part as Partners in the SHERPA project proposal: their joint participation brings it to the highest levels of credibility, representativeness and authoritativeness. Furthermore, the consortium itself is led by UIC, whose aggregative nature, together with its solid expertise and experience in participating and leading European projects, will facilitate synergies among the co-applicants and between them and police, first responders and other relevant stakeholders represented in the Advisory Board such as CER, COLPOFER, RAILPOL, NS and SBB.



## 2. PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT

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The Report on a coherent approach to risk assessment and management (hereinafter, also referred only as “Report”) is intended to summarize the different activities carried out within SHERPA WP2 and to define a coherent approach for terrorist risk assessment and management.

In accordance with the overall structure of SHERPA Project WP2, this document is divided in three parts, aimed at describing the outcomes of the previous activities:

### **PART A: Analysis of the Database of terrorism-related attacks against rail transport in 12 European countries.**

The first part of the Report features the results of the analysis carried out on the final version of the Database of terrorism-related attacks against rail transport in 12 European countries (hereinafter, also referred only as “Database”).

The final version of the Database results from the collection of validated contributions provided by Consortium partners about attacks carried out in the past years in their respective countries.

### **PART B: Lessons learned from past terrorist attacks:**

The second part of this Report summarizes the lessons learned from attacks occurred in the recent years (2014-2018). Each co-applicant provided contributions about its own experiences concerning terrorism and terrorist attacks, outlining the challenges faced, the adopted approaches in assessing and managing the issues, the acknowledged shortcomings and the lessons learned.

### **PART C: Coherent approach on terrorist risk assessment and management:**

This part of the Report describes the Coherent approach on terrorism assessment and management that was identified and validated by the project consortium through the contributions provided by each partner:

- Answering a detailed survey (December 2018);
- Discussing in person during the Workshop (WS1) held in Brussels on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2019.
- Finalization in person during the Progress meeting (PM1) held in Paris on the 13<sup>th</sup> of February 2019.



## Terminology

- **Business continuity:** Capability of the organization to continue delivery of products or services at acceptable predefined levels following disruptive incident (ISO 22300).
- **Business continuity management:** Holistic management process that identifies potential threat to an organization and the impacts to business operations those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability of an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities (ISO 22301).
- **Risk assessment:** Overarching process aimed at identifying, analyzing and evaluating the risk (based on ISO 31000).
- **Risk identification:** Is the first step of risk assessment. It is a process which is aimed at identifying, understanding and describing the risks that could potentially affect the achievement of railway companies' business objectives (based on ISO 31000).
- **Risk analysis:** Is the second step of risk assessment. It is meant to clarify the nature, sources, and causes of the risks that have been already identified and to estimate the level of risk. Furthermore, impacts and consequences are taken into account and existing measures are examined (based on ISO 31000).
- **Risk evaluation:** Is the third step of risk assessment. It is used to compare the results coming from analysis with risk acceptance criteria in order to determine whether or not a specified level of risk is acceptable or tolerable (based on ISO 31000).
- **Risk management/treatment:** Is based on the results of the previously described activities. It encompasses a coordinated set of activities which are used to effectively manage (e.g. mitigation, acceptance) the different risks potentially affecting the business objectives (based on ISO 31000).
- **Terrorism-related attack:** The attempted or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> START Consortium, July 2018. Global Terrorism Database – Codebook, available online at the address: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>



## Executive summary

The aim of this deliverable was to produce a comprehensive and consistent understanding of terrorism related threats concerning railway stations and trains and to elaborate a coherent approach for terrorist risk assessment and management in the railway sector. The involved partners were responsible for collecting data, lessons learnt and information on risk assessment and management in their respective country (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Poland). Contributions were also provided by experts from the advisory board (Netherlands).

### **Summary of the results of the Analysis of the Database of terrorism-related attacks against rail transport:**

The analysed Database includes 334 terrorism-related events from 12 European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland (Republic of), Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom). All the entries included in the Database are based on open-source data.

The overall trend regarding the number of attacks is increasing and the ongoing decade is the one with the highest number of attacks. In 2018 there were 2 attacks against railways in the SHERPA Project countries, a steep decrease from the previous years. Even if attacks against SHERPA Consortium Countries produced, overall, significantly less casualties than the ones perpetrated against the other European Countries analysed, from 2015 every year counted at least one deadly and/or injuring attack.

Regarding the means of attacks, while for the whole period explosives represent the preferred mean of attack, in the period 2013-2018 they have been widely replaced by incendiary attacks and sabotages. Armed assaults represent a new phenomenon. No attacks or attempted attacks by CBRN means have been registered since 1974.

### **Summary of the lessons learned from past terrorist attacks:**

The second part of this Report summarizes the lessons learned from attacks occurred in the recent years (2014-2018). Each partner provided contributions about its own experiences concerning terrorism and terrorist attacks, outlining the challenges faced, the adopted approaches in assessing and managing the issues, the acknowledged shortcomings and the lessons learned.

Some of the main conclusions are the following:

- The terrorist risk should be considered at a strategic level in order to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy to manage it. Concerning risk identification/assessment, the main responsibility belongs to public authorities, however rail companies should be aware of the terrorism threats, contribute and cooperate in defining possible threat scenarios and assessing the possible consequences of attacks. Therefore, a clear definition of the roles (state/government organisation) and responsibilities of the actors should be defined upstream for the case of emerging threats or terrorist incidents happening.
- In some EU-countries the national legislation provides the obligation to protect critical parts of railway infrastructure. Proportionate and assessed measures should be sought. Since staff, passengers and other individuals are directly or indirectly impacted by attacks or



threats, it lies also with the railway companies' own operational interest to implement and ensure measures (e. g. technical, organizational and human factor related measures) to protect vulnerable areas of their infrastructure.

- Communication within companies, between companies and others (e. g. police, government) are crucial to manage crises and should be clearly defined. Reliable, disturbance-proof and secure communication tools should be in place and available (24/7) both internally and outbound (e.g. with law enforcement, other responders). In addition, a consistent company communication strategy towards staff, public and media should be in place.
- Sharing good and bad practices with all the relevant stakeholders on essential topics represents an improvement opportunity bringing advancements in dealing with the terrorist threat. Multidisciplinary and regular exercises with the public authorities need to be performed involving also third parties (shop owners, public transport services, etc.).

### **Summary of the coherent approach on terrorist risk assessment and management:**

This part of the Report describes the Coherent approach on terrorism assessment and management that was identified by the project consortium through the contributions provided by each partner.

The following criteria for a coherent approach are meant as suggestions for railway companies and to complementary the already existing internally risk assessment and management methodology.

#### **Responsibility:**

In General, national authorities are responsible for carrying out risk assessment and management concerning terrorism related threats. Nevertheless, a strong cooperation with sensitive infrastructure operators is essential to better describe the risk and the consequences for their business, which has generally a high impact on the society and environment. Therefore, the railway company should contribute to identify critical points and consequences among the railway environment as well as describe the effects of countermeasures.

#### **Risk assessment:**

- As of 2019, there is no widespread consensus at international and European law level over a unified definition of "terrorism". All the definitions should be aligned with the national criminal law. In case of a dedicate definition, it should contain a minimum of elements:
  - Means: illegal, an intentional act, preparing or carrying out serious violence, intimidation, infrastructural damage
  - Effects: death, injury, influence public opinion or political decision making, affect fear, destabilization, attain religious, social, economic goals
- As of 2019, no dedicated terrorist risk assessment methodology is specifically adapted to the railway domain. Therefore, a combination of elements coming from different methodologies has been adopted.
- The responsibility for the risk identification lies with the public authorities and/ or public institutions. The analysis of the risk should be the result of an interaction between authorities (ministries, intelligence services, public institutions, etc.) and railway operators.
- In addition to the public authorities, the railway companies might use a multitude of sources to help identify the risk for their internal risk assessment (whenever mandatory).



- If there is an enterprise risk management, then this risk of terrorism should be incorporated as a business risk.
- All relevant entities/departments of the company should be involved in risk evaluation

### **Risk management:**

- Top management should be involved in making decisions to mitigate or acceptance of the (residual) risk
- The actions to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks should focus on multiple themes (benchmarking, communication, security management, etc.)
- It should be clear which function is responsible for following up the status of the actions
- A predefined internal reporting process should be in place
- External parties (e. g. authorities) should be informed on a regular basis

### **Main challenges and conclusion**

The European countries have their own specificities and reaching a detailed common approach is very challenging. National legislation and distribution of roles and responsibilities for terrorism are not homogeneous from one State to another. Moreover, the level of terrorist threat is also very different in European countries.

In almost all the cases, the responsibility for carrying out risk assessment and management belongs to public authorities, which leads to the fact that the railway sector does not often have legal access to some sensitive information. The present report should therefore be read as an analysis by the railway sector from its point of view, based on the limited information that is available.

Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the terrorist risk represents only a part of the holistic company risk assessment and management, together with other daily threat risks coming e.g. from vandalism, graffiti, theft/fraud.

Finally, the international or European element must be taken into account insofar as passengers should enjoy comparable levels of protection when they travel. Otherwise, they will fail to understand the measures in place and, on the contrary, may develop a feeling of inconsistency with regard to the railway companies taking them from A to B.

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